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Who controls the income earned by members of women's self help groups (SHG) 
from group activities—they or their husbands? The answer indicates one 
dimension of the level of economic empowerment attained by SHG members. 
This paper examines whether identity of the person controlling this income 
depends upon the political party ruling the municipality where the SHG is 
situated. Two parties are considered—the Left Front, a coalition comprising of 
Leftist parties, and the Indian National Congress. This paper is based on a field 
study of 240 SHG members in six municipalities in West Bengal, a major state in 
India. 
 




The participation of women in economic activities is usually seen as a necessary, though 
not sufficient, condition for their economic empowerment. However, it is often difficult 
to involve poor women in developing countries in such activities. The lack of education 
and enterprise and the inability to take risks are important constraints in this context. In 
such cases, policy makers often rely on self help groups (SHGs) to mobilize women and 
use their collective enterprise to involve them in economic activities.  
 
In India, the Swarna Jayanti Sahari Swarozgar Yojana (SJSSY) is an important group-
based poverty alleviation programme targeting urban slum dwellers. (1) The scheme is 
centrally sponsored but administered by the State governments. (2) It was launched on 1 
December 1997. The scheme aims to provide gainful employment to the urban 
unemployed or underemployed poor by encouraging them to set up self-employment 
ventures or by providing them wage employment. The scheme also assists groups of 
urban poor women in setting up gainful self-employment ventures. This sub-scheme is 
referred to as 'The Scheme for Development of Women and Children in Urban Areas' 
(DWCUAs). This component is distinguished by the focus on poor women residing in 
urban slums who set up self-employment ventures not as individuals but as groups. 
Groups of at least 10 women form SHGs (called DWCUAs by members and municipal 
officers) and take up economic activities suited to their skill, training, aptitude and local 
conditions. While the DWCUA's primary objective is employment generation, it is 
expected that DWCUAs will also empower its members socially. 
 
 The SJSRY is based on community empowerment; it does not rely on traditional top-
down management. The programme relies on the establishment and promotion of 
community organizations and structures to provide supporting and facilitating 
mechanisms for local development. While the Poverty Eradication Cells of the urban 
local bodies (ULBs) are primarily responsible for creating community structures, they are 
assisted in this task by elected councillors and local political workers. This links political 
parties with the implementation of this scheme, and so the success or failure of the 
scheme may depend upon the political party in power. The creation of links with political 
parties may become a major issue in states like West Bengal (during the period 1977-
2011), marked by an extraordinarily high level of political stability. In West Bengal, the 
Left Front—a coalition comprising of Communist and left-leaning parties headed by the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist)—was democratically elected to power for seven 
successive terms between 1977 and 2007. The 34-year rule by the same political 
coalition, along with the virtual absence of any effective opposition, enabled the 
constituent parties, particularly the Communist Party of India (Marxist), to effectively 
control institutions like local decentralized governance bodies, administrative, executive, 
education, health services, and so on, and regulate the flow of services from them 
(Choudhuri 2010; Datta 2007). 
 
This paper examines one of the multiple aspects reflecting the scheme's success—control 
over the income that the member earns from her DWCUA activities. In particular, we 
examine whether the identity of the political party ruling the municipality determines 
who controls this income within the household of the SHG member. This paper 
 hypothesizes that having a Leftist (local) government leads to greater political 
participation by individuals, including potential SHG members, which increases the 
probability of controlling the income generated from SHG activities—a very important 
dimension of economic empowerment. 
 
The paper is based on a field survey of 240 SHG members undertaken in six 
municipalities of West Bengal, a major state in India. The survey was undertaken 
between the months of February and August 2009. While structured questionnaires were 
administered to SHG members, the authors interviewed the councillors and the officers of 
the Poverty Eradication Cells (particularly the town project officers) and of the 
community structures forming part of the SJSSY. In addition, we interviewed 
representatives of two political parties, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the 
Indian National Congress, to obtain information about their respective sources. 
 
In the following sections, the paper briefly identifies the determinants of empowerment 
(Section 2); describes the guidelines of the SJSSY, the survey methodology and data 
(Section 3); discusses the findings (Section 4); and offers some explanations of the results 
(Section 5). The paper concludes by identifying some policy concerns and areas for 
future research. 
  
Empowerment: definition and determinants 
Empowerment is viewed broadly as increasing poor people's freedom of choice and 
action to shape their own lives (Narayan 2005: 4). It is the process of enhancing an 
 individual's or group's capacity to make effective choices—that is, to make choices and 
then to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes (Alsop, Bertelsen and 
Holland 2006: 10). While this has many dimensions, this paper focuses on only one of 
these dimensions—economic empowerment, in the form of controlling income earned by 
the women. Although this is a narrow approach, it is useful as a starting point to analyze 
the relationship between political setting and agency, before broadening the definition to 
incorporate the remaining diverse and complex dimensions of empowerment and agency. 
 
Determinants of empowerment  
There is a substantial body of research on empowerment and its determinants. (3) These 
determinants may be classified into individual traits, household traits and social context. 
 
Individual traits that determine empowerment levels include factors like age of 
respondent, education, her mobility and her participation in economic activities. The 
structure of the household, the relationship with the husband and the number of 
children—particularly the presence of boys—are important household-level 
characteristics that determine level of empowerment.  
 
Finally, government policies may affect empowerment also. SHGs are commonly 
believed to be an important form of intervention. A study in Nigeria found that SHG 
members had significantly greater access to productive resources (Soetan 1999). 
Researchers have shown how the spread of SHGs have had beneficial impacts on some 
household outcomes like health, nutrition, family planning, education (particularly of the 
 girl child) and family decision-making. However, the impact of SHGs may be limited by 
contextual factors. For instance, access to credit in a patriarchal setting may actually 
decrease functional capabilities of women (Goetz and Sengupta 1996). The effect of 
marital status has also been examined documented by researchers. In many cases, the 
credit provided to women is appropriated by their husbands or other male relatives.  
 
Political setting and empowerment 
Despite the substantial body of work on determinants of empowerment, the literature has 
failed to explore the influence of the political setting on empowerment. A possible 
explanation is that empowerment relates to the household sphere whereas the political 
environment belongs to a broader domain. However, the ideology of the existing political 
parties and their nature of functioning often determine the extent of empowerment 
targeted by government intervention, opportunities (particularly economic) created and 
the space available for women within these opportunities—all of which are important 
determinants of the success of micro-credit programmes (Mayoux 2001). This is very 
important, given the recent findings establishing that the selection process of SHG 
members is often highly selective (Karim 2011; Husain et al 2012). On the other hand, 
intervention strategies to increase empowerment are often viewed by political parties as 
instruments for garnering political support. Movements of SHGs are particularly 
important in this context. In recent years, there have been claims that political parties in 
different regions of India are attempting to use SHGs to increase their political base: The 
network of the cooperative sector had been used by political parties for their interest in 
many ways. Now, the mushrooming of the SHGs has also provided a good alternative to 
 the parties. The SHGs are a part of the grassroots level and give easy access to political 
parties to reach to masses. There always remains a fear that the SHG movement can 
suffer if it is exploited by political parties. (Sanyogita Dhamdhere, cited in Khape 2009) 
 
Another study of SHGs in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa and Rajasthan reported that 
“… the members (or their families) often have political leanings and activities even 
before they were members of SHGs” (EDA and APMAS 2006: 5). On the other hand, a 
study by Reddy and Manak (2005) finds evidence that joining SHGs increases 
participation in the political arena. A similar finding has also been reported by Hashem, 
Schuler and Riley (1996).  
 
It is therefore necessary to examine how the political settings in which the SHGs are 
established affect the empowerment levels of its members. Although literature identifies 
several indicators of economic empowerment—such as the ability to make small 
purchases and to own productive assets, involvement in major financial decisions and 
control over the income generated from SHG activities (Hashemi et al 1996)—this paper 
focuses only on who controls the income earned by respondents from SHG activities. 
Only one indicator was chosen because increased involvement of women in other forms 
of economic decision-making was found to be negligible in the study area (Husain et al 
2012). Moreover, this form of economic empowerment has a significant impact on 
empowerment of women and the household (Blumberg 2005; Samarasinghe 1993). 
 
Background 
 This section provides information on the SHGs studied in this paper and details of the 
survey site and sampling methodology. 
 
Guidelines of the SJSSY 
As mentioned previously, the DWCUAs are formed by at least 10 members belonging to 
BPL families. The social capital necessary for the success of the scheme is built by first 
encouraging the women to set up Thrift and Credit Societies/Groups. (4) It was observed 
that councillors and local cells of the ruling political party play an important role in such 
mobilization. Neighbourhood meetings are organized, house-to-house campaigns are 
conducted and women—identified by the local party workers—are encouraged to join the 
TCGs. The main activity of TCGs is saving on a monthly basis, and borrowing money 
from a revolving fund operated by the government. (5)  
 
After TCGs have operated for some years, the members are encouraged to graduate to the 
second stage and form DWCUAs. The group itself selects the income-generating activity. 
Financial assistance is received from two sources: (1) the revolving fund and (2) 
commercial loans subsidized by the State Urban Development Agency (bureaucratic 
agency overseeing implementation of the SJSSY in the state of West Bengal). (6) The 
DWCUAs conduct business using these funds. They have monthly meetings where the 
running of the venture is discussed and operational decisions are made. A part of the 
surplus is also distributed among the members. This paper refers to control over this 
income. 
 
 In West Bengal, there were 21,717 TCGS with about 350,000 members in 2007. 
However, DWCUAs evolved more slowly as it was difficult to mobilize women to form 
TCGs and develop the social cohesion to set up a joint income earning venture. As on 31 
August 2007 there were 690 DWCUA groups, of whom 229 (33 per cent) have been 
linked to banks.  
 
Profile of survey sites  
While discussing possible survey sites, SUDA officials informed us that although almost 
all ULBs had DWCUAs, the DWCUAs in a majority of ULBs were generally unstable—
disintegrating three or four months after their formation and being reformed by 
municipalities with a new combination of members (to meet annual targets for DWCUAs 
set by the SUDA) before disintegrating again. There was no point in studying such 
unstable groups as they did not undertake income-generating activities for any 
meaningful period, so that the question of control over income and economic 
empowerment was not relevant for members belonging to such DWCUAs. We therefore 
decided to focus on municipalities that had a history of stable DWCUAs. In this study we 
surveyed six ULBs—Kaliagunj (Uttar Dinajpur), Old Maldah (Maldah), Barrackpore 
(North 24 Parganas), Chandannagar (Hooghly), Burdwan (Burdwan) and Gayeshpur 
(Nadia). The specific municipalities were suggested by the SUDA as the scheme was 
particularly successful in these areas. For the same reason, instead of taking a random 
sample of DWCUAs, we surveyed ‘stable’ DWCUAs—entities that are in existence for 
over a year. As control group, we also sampled newly formed DWCUAs that local 
 officials identified as stable although they had been in existence for only about six 
months.  
 
Within each DWCUA surveyed we interviewed an ordinary member and a post-holder. 
About a third of respondents were selected randomly, called to the respective 
municipality offices and interviewed in the absence of municipality officers. This helped 
to establish rapport with the DWCUA members. After arriving at a familiar footing, the 
team of surveyors was able to initiate surveys at the locality of DWCUA members 
unaccompanied by municipality officials and without drawing attention to themselves or 
standing out. The remaining respondents—selected on the basis of a purposive snowball 
sampling method—were interviewed at their homes or in a neutral venue. While the use 
of a non-random sampling methodology may affect the extent to which our results can be 
generalized, this method enabled us to avoid ‘floating’ DWCUA members, who float 
between unstable DWCUAs referred to earlier. Of course, this method has one 
problem—snowballing might have led to referral to only other members with similar 
affiliations. However, given that the starting point was non-random (the initial one third 
members from whom we sought referral were selected randomly), such an error is 
unlikely to have seriously affected results. Table 1 breaks down the sample by district. 
Table 1: Sample by site 
Municipality DWCUA 
members 
Number of members 
interviewed 
Percentage of members 
interviewed 
Barrackpore 376 44 11.7 
Burdwan 82 13 15.9 
Chandannagar 108 23 21.3 
Gayeshpur 115 5 4.3 
 Municipality DWCUA 
members 
Number of members 
interviewed 
Percentage of members 
interviewed 
Kaliagunj 3347 110 3.3 
Old Maldah 3289 45 1.4 
TOTAL 7317 240 3.3 
Source: State Urban Development Agency, communication dated 15 October 2009. 
Four of the survey sites have been selected from the six districts having the largest 
number of DWCUAs (comprising Uttar Dinajpur, Maldah, Birbhum, North 24 Parganas, 
Murshidabad and Burdwan). In addition, we have also surveyed two other municipalities 
situated in districts where the SJSSY has been relatively unsuccessful. The sample size 
from each municipality was chosen in proportion to the number of successful SHGs in 
the area. Thus, only five members were surveyed from Gayeshpur, which had only two 
long running SHGs, while the sample size of Kaliagunj was much larger as there was a 
larger number of long-running SHGs in the town. 
 
Out of the six municipalities studied, four were controlled by the Left Front coalition that 
controlled the state of West Bengal between 1977 and 2011. The other two are Maldah 
and Dinajpur; both the municipalities surveyed in these districts are traditional bastions of 
the Indian National Congress (henceforth Congress).  
 
There are also differences in the economic setting of the municipalities surveyed. Three 
of the sites have strong links to the agricultural sector—of which Burdwan is located in a 
developed and prosperous agricultural hinterland, while Kaliagunj and Old Maldah are 
agro-based but underdeveloped towns. Barrackpore and Gayeshpur are industrial towns. 
Barrackpore was once an important industrial area; the decline of the jute industry has 
 eroded its economic importance. However, its proximity to the metropolitan city of 
Kolkata and its well developed educational infrastructure has resulted in a relatively 
educated population. Gayeshpur, on the other hand, is a satellite of the industrial 
township of Kalyani. It is relatively under-developed. The spectacular success of some 
specific SHGs led us to study this site. The last site, Chandannagar, was originally set up 
as a French colony in 1784. Its proximity and transport links to Kolkata has resulted in 
the growth of the service sector in this town.  
 
DWCUA activities and income 
The range of activities undertaken by SHG members varies widely. While tailoring, 
catering and garments trading are common activities, local circumstances encourage 
activities in specific lines. In Kaliagunj and Old Maldah, for instance, many of the 
DWCUAs carry on agro-based activities like rice trading, mustard trade, agricultural 
stocks, converting grain to rice, farming, livestock farming, poultry farming, fishing, 
carpentry, handicraft and similar activities. There are also some bakeries and roadside 
snack stalls in Kaliagunj; two DWCUAs have also set up a catering business. In 
Burdwan, a DWCUA had set up a canteen on the University of Burdwan campus; this 
DWCUA also supplies food to the in-patients of the Burdwan Medical Hospital. The fact 
that Burdwan is the rice granary of West Bengal has also encouraged many DWCUAs to 
engage in manufacture and sale of puffed rice. In Barrackpore, the presence of Muslims 
who are culturally associated with the zari trade means that zari making is an important 
activity. (7) In addition, DWCUAs also manufacture leather bags, jute bags, and soft 
toys. Some DWCUAs also run grocery shops; another operates an STD booth. In 
 Chandannagar, tailoring is a common activity. Dishari also runs a canteen in an eye 
hospital. Garments and saree trading is a common activity in all ULBs except 
Barrackpore. In places like Kaliagunj and Old Maldah, women transport their wares in 
small vans to adjacent villages, and some women trade door-to-door within their 
neighbourhood. In Chandannagar, we observed fixed shop retailing in sarees. In 
Gayeshpur, the DWCUA studied has set up a night shelter for relatives of in-patients 
admitted to the local hospital.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the monthly surplus from SHG activities is distributed among its 
members. Such income is quite substantial. The monthly median income from DWCUA-
related activities is Rs 400. This comprises about 21 per cent of the household income. 
This is of considerable importance in increasing consumption levels, tiding over seasonal 
crises, meeting educational and health related expenditure and acquiring financial and 
other assets (savings account, life insurance policies, bicycles, etc.).  
 
Who controls the income? 
Our survey revealed that almost 50 per cent of the respondents decide how to spend their 
own income, while about 30 per cent make this decision jointly with their husbands. This 
would imply that 80 per cent of respondents have at least some control over their income, 
which is very encouraging. However, the relationship between the respondent's marital 
status and her control over income is important. Since 23 of the total respondents are 
either unmarried or are widows or have been deserted by their husbands, this raises the 
possibility that control over income may be the result not of empowerment but simply of 
 the lack of male authority figures within the household. Parvin et al. (2004), for instance, 
finds a high correlation between marital status and control over income. This was also 
supported by statistical tests on our data. We therefore considered only the sub-sample of 
217 married respondents in this paper. 
 
When considering the site-wise variation of control over income, we found that the 
proportion of respondents with full control over income is substantially higher in Left-
controlled municipalities (Figure 1). 
Fig. 1: Control over income and identity of ruling party 
 
The magnitude of difference in the proportion of respondents with full control over 
income from SHG activities between Congress and Left-run towns is surprising. After 
assigning scores of 0, 0.5 and 1 to the three levels of control, we ran a t-test to test for 
statistically significant differences in the average scores between the two groups. The t-
value of 3.4896 is significant at 1 per cent level. However, this test has three 
disadvantages. Firstly, the values assigned to scores are ad hoc and may influence 
 average scores. Secondly, it is based on the assumption of a normal distribution of the 
scores. To overcome these methodological problems, we have used the Mann-Whitney 
U- and Kruskall-Wallis H-tests. Since these are based on ranks and do not assume a 
normal distribution, they are stronger tests. The results of both these tests confirm our 
earlier conclusion—that there is a difference in empowerment levels between Left and 
Congress controlled towns—at 1 per cent level of significance. 
 
The third problem with such tests is common to both the classical and non-parametric 
tests—neither controls for differences in socio-economic characteristics of respondents. 
Now, educational levels are relatively high in Barrackpore and Chandannagar. If this is 
true for the other Left towns, as is evident from Table 2, then the difference may simply 
reflect differences in education and not political control.  





































Illiterate - 5.5 - 7.7 - 6.7 
Can read/write 9.1 8.2 8.7 - - 17.8 
Below secondary 15.9 55.5 34.8 46.2 40.0 51.1 
Completed secondary 36.4 26.4 43.5 15.4 60.0 17.8 
Higher secondary 38.6 4.5 13.0 30.8 - 6.7 
 
To overcome this problem we use a regression model, regressing control over income 
(RRINC) on a dummy for Left-controlled towns (LEFT) and controlling for socio-
economic characteristics of respondents. Religion (REL) and caste (CASTE) dummies 
 were incorporated as it is often alleged that Muslims and backward castes are 
marginalized. We also incorporated per capita income (PCY), age of the respondent 
(AGE) and education level of respondent and husband (REDRESP and EDHUSB), as 
educated or older respondents or those from affluent and educated households are likely 
to be more empowered. As the empowerment dynamics are likely to be different in 
households below the poverty line, a dummy indicating economic status (whether 
respondent is a below poverty line card holder (8), ESTAT) was used. We also controlled 
for household size (HHSIZE) as women in unitary families may have higher bargaining 
power. Finally, we also added a dummy to indicate a newly inducted SHG member 
(DWCUA) to capture the possible effect of long-term membership.  
 
We have also attempted to control for differences in district/town characteristics as 
educational level, income level and economic structure. For the profile of the population 
from which our sample is drawn (coming from BPL urban slum-dwelling households) 
two variables relating to locality-specific characteristics are included in the regression—
the female literacy level (as more educated areas are expected to have more empowered 
women) and the percentage of BPL population (indicating the size of target population). 
These are represented by MFL and MBPL, respectively.  
 
Since there are differences in the nature of operations, scale and profitability of SHGs, a 
control for these differences also has to be introduced. The three possible controls 
conceptually relevant for our purpose are types of activity, surplus of SHGs and 
contribution of SHG income to household income. The latter two are correlated; 
 therefore, only one may be used in our econometric model (we have used contribution of 
SHG income to household income, PCONT). On the other hand, there is a wide variety of 
activities undertaken by SHGs. In fact, some SHGs in Kaliagunj even undertake multiple 
activities—with some simultaneously operating as many as four lines of business. The 
resultant categories of SHGs, therefore, are too large for any relevant analysis.  
 
Another problem that may appear relevant is that of selectivity bias. The characteristics 
of women who have joined SHGs may differ from those who stay away from such 
movements. It may be that more empowered women join DWCUAs. Fortunately, this 
problem is not relevant here. The objective of this paper is not to study the relation 
between the level of control over household income (economic empowerment) and 
participation in SHGs but to study the relation between the level of control of income 
from DWCUA activities and the political party implementing the scheme locally. Since 
only DWCUA members earn income from SHG activities, there is no selectivity bias 
involved here. 
 
Given the discrete, non-binary and ordinal nature of the response variable, an ordered 
logit is appropriate (Table 3). (9) 
Table 3: Results of generalized ordered logit for control over respondents' income 
No control vs partial 
control and full control 
No control and partial 
control vs full control Variables 
Coef z P>|z| Coef z P>|z| 
REL -0.09 -0.13 0.90 0.72 1.21 0.23 
RCASTE 0.47 1.04 0.30 0.49 1.36 0.18 
ESTAT -0.49 -1.08 0.28 0.48 1.33 0.18 
 REDRES 0.30 0.98 0.33 -0.59 -2.51 0.01 
EDHUSB -0.05 -0.29 0.78 0.36 3.18 0.00 
AGE 0.03 0.93 0.35 -0.01 -0.55 0.58 
HHSIZE -0.35 -2.73 0.01 -0.08 -0.78 0.44 
PCONT 0.02 0.81 0.42 0.02 1.32 0.19 
PCY 0.00 1.03 0.30 0.00 -0.10 0.92 
MFL -0.85 -2.91 0.00 -0.45 -2.73 0.01 
MBPL -0.24 -2.57 0.01 -0.12 -1.88 0.06 
DWCUA 1.14 1.53 0.13 -1.04 -1.72 0.09 
LEFT 20.08 2.58 0.01 11.96 2.63 0.01 
INTERCEPT 46.64 3.02 0.00 24.43 2.68 0.01 
N 216 Pseudo 
R2 
0.198 LR χ2 88.26 Prob: 
0.00 
 
The results of the regression model show that even after controlling for socio-economic 
characteristics, the probability of respondents controlling the income from SHGs is 
higher if they come from Left-run municipalities. Other important results are that 
educated respondents or with husbands with low levels of education are less likely to 
have full control over the income from SHG activities; respondents from large 
households are more likely not to have control over the income; and respondents who had 
joined DWCUAs for more than a year are less likely to have full control over the income. 
In addition, respondents from ULBs with a higher proportion of BPL people or from 
ULBs with higher levels of female literacy are likely to have less control over income. 
Since coefficients of some of the variables are statistically insignificant, we tested for 
multicollinearity. Correlation between per capita income and household size and between 
DWCUA and PCONT was found to be high (0.3749 and 0.6797, respectively). This 
 implies that respondents having higher per capita income are less likely not to exercise 
control over income, while respondents whose SHG income comprises a higher 
proportion of household income is more likely to have full control over SHG income. 
 
Discussion of results 
The relationship between the identity of the political party controlling the municipality 
and an SHG member's control over her income is an interesting one and requires 
explanation. We argue that the differing natures of the two political parties lead to 
different levels of participation and involvement in the political arena. This, in turn, 
facilitates DWCUA members to exercise control over the income generated from SHG 
activities.  
 
Role of political participation 
A major difference between the two political parties lies in their organizational structure. 
The Indian National Congress is a loosely organized political party based on principles of 
voluntary participation in party activities. The nature of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) (CPM, in short), the major constituent of the Left Front, is quite different. The 
CPM has a regimented and hierarchical structure. It has a network of parallel and 
superior units throughout the state—starting from the local level. The politburo exercises 
control over party members. Applicants are carefully vetted before they are admitted to 
the party. After joining, these members—and, in fact, even non-member supporters—
have to participate in party activities such as demonstrations, meetings, processions, 
propaganda activities, classes, social and cultural activities, and so on. Their activities are 
 evaluated annually and membership renewed only if their participation is found 
satisfactory. Those who take part in party activities regularly are identified and rewarded. 
(10) In Chandannagar, for instance, some women supporters requested the local 
councillor to do ‘something’ for them. They were told to form a DWCUA and were 
provided space for an outlet in the municipal market to sell sarees. In contrast, the Indian 
National Congress is primarily based on voluntary principles. The party does have a 
hierarchical structure, but it is rather loose with considerable autonomy to local units. 
Members are expected to participate in political demonstrations and processions, but their 
activities are not monitored and evaluated on a systematic basis; neither is their 
membership renewed on the basis of their activities undertaken in the past year. 
 
Thus, CPM members and supporters have to involve themselves in party-oriented 
activities more than Congress members and supporters. Further, this style of functioning 
reinforces the party identity of a Left supporter or member. (11) We found that 54 per 
cent of respondents in Congress municipalities participate in party activities, like political 
demonstrations and processions (measured by the variable RPMEET); this proportion is 
82 per cent in Left-run municipalities. (12) The average score of political participation in 
the latter (1.3) is significantly higher than the average participation score in Congress-run 
municipalities (0.7) at 1 per cent level. The statistical difference in scores is also 
supported by the results of the non-parametric tests.  
 
A logit model to identify the determinants of political participation by individual 
DWCUA members reveals that participation in political meetings, processions and other 
 party-based activities is significantly higher in Left-run municipalities even after 
controlling for socio-economic variables (Table 4). Also, Muslims and respondents from 
low per capita income households and from larger households are less likely to 
participate in political activities. Although the coefficient of RCASTE is insignificant, 
this may be due to correlation. The negative sign of the coefficient of RCASTE implies 
that women from backward castes are more prone to participate in the political arena. 
Table 4: Results of logit model for political participation 
Variables Coefficient z Probability 
REL 2.67 4.79 0.00 
RCASTE -0.17 -0.50 0.62 
PCY 0.00 -1.64 0.10 
HHSIZE -0.15 -1.77 0.08 
EDHUSB 0.03 0.29 0.77 
REDRES -0.08 -0.37 0.71 
DWCUA 0.02 0.04 0.97 
LEFT 2.32 4.57 0.00 
INTERCEPT -0.90 -0.90 0.37 
McFadden R2 0.200 N 239 
Cox-Snell R2 0.230 Log likelihood -124.90 
Nagelkerke R2 0.316 LR χ2 62.50 
Count R2 0.707 Probability > χ2    0.00 
 
What is interesting is that, in most cases, the members had political associations before 
joining DWCUAs. While discussing the formation of DWCUAs in Burdwan, members of 
Mahila Samitis (women's councils established by the CPM) and Ward Committees 
admitted that DWCUA members were carefully selected from supporters. In fact, in 
response to the demands of poor slum dwellers, with a record of participating in political 
 activities, to alleviate their poverty local councillors often assisted them to get enrolled in 
DWCUAs. Ward Committee members opined that this enabled the party to keep their 
poor supporters satisfied. During our survey, we found that 17 per cent of the SHG 
members had been persuaded to join DWCUAs by political workers. In Burdwan, where 
the CPM is particularly powerful, 54 per cent of SHG members had been enrolled by 
members of the Mahila Samiti or Ward Committee. Members of Community 
Development Societies, most of whom have political associations, also play a prominent 
role in the formation of DWCUAs. In Barrackpore, they were responsible for enlisting 
over 50 per cent of the members of the DWCUAs; in Burdwan, too, this proportion is 
high (34 per cent).  
 
Political participation and economic empowerment 
We next hypothesize that participation in the political arena increases respondents' 
awareness and empowers them as they interact with other women, acquire knowledge 
about the outside world, learn about rights that women demand or have acquired 
elsewhere and become more expressive in their actions. As a collective gender-based 
identity develops, their participation increases their sense of power and confidence of 
effecting gender relations. (13) They become more aware that they are contributing to the 
family (perceived contribution response increases) and their welfare should count in 
making household decisions (perceived interest response). This awareness spills over to 
the household sphere. The fallback situation of party members and supporters also 
improves as they develop ties with Mahila Samitis. This increases their ability to raise 
 demands within their household and reduces their tolerance of domestic violence. Most 
importantly, women start demanding greater control over expenditure decisions. 
Fig. 2: Control over income and participation in political activities 
 
Figure 2 shows that the proportion of respondents with control over income increases 
with the level of participation in the political arena. This is also supported by results of 
the t-test and non-parametric tests. To test for the impact of political participation on 
empowerment, we have to estimate an ordered logit of control over income over political 
participation and the control variables used earlier. However, two additional issues are 
important here. 
 
Firstly, it may appear worthwhile to also include a ‘left party dummy’ along with 
RPMEET in the above regression model to explore whether political participation is the 
only channel through which a Left-leaning party helps enhance women’s economic status 
at home. For example, the ideologies held by the Left-leaning parties may focus more on 
progressive social causes such as gender equality, which as a result helps women in their 
 controlled regions to be more assertive in gaining control over household income. 
However, this point would be more relevant if Right-wing parties such as the Bharatiya 
Janata Party or Shiva Sena, which believe in a more passive ‘traditional’ role for women, 
were also in the picture. Both political parties being examined in this paper, however, 
emphasize in their manifesto and pamphlets on equality of women and their 
empowerment (14), so that this issue is of less relevance in the context of the survey 
location. Further, there is a statistical problem in including dummies for both political 
participation and Left parties. As both variables are related, a multi-collinearity problem 
may emerge. Hence, it becomes difficult to separate the different channels through which 
the Left party effect is operating.  
 
Now the selectivity bias referred to earlier may indeed be important here as some women 
may be more predisposed to participate in the political arena than others. Therefore, we 
have also run a Heckman selection (Heckit) model regressing control over income on the 
level of political participation, and (in the selection equation) regressing a binary form of 
political participation on control variables and the left dummy (Chiburis and Lokshin 
2007) (Table 5). The results for the selection equation indicate that older respondents and 
those belonging to the Hindu community are more likely to take part in political 
activities, while the results for the main equation reveal that respondents with educated 
husbands or from smaller families are more likely to exercise full control over income 
from SHG activities. Most important, it can be seen that political participation continues 
to affect empowerment significantly—though only after a critical level. 
 
 Table 5: Results of Heckit model for ordered logit of control over respondents' 
income and political participation 
  
Variables Coefficient z Probability Coefficient z Probability 
Selection Equation 
LEFT 7.33 0.69 0.49 
AGE 0.05 3.16 0.00 
REL 1.07 3.21 0.00 
RCASTE -0.16 -0.71 0.48 
ESTAT -0.33 -1.51 0.13 
REDRES 0.00 -0.02 0.99 
EDHUSB 0.05 0.74 0.46 
HHSIZE -0.05 -0.87 0.38 
PCY 0.00 -0.82 0.41 
PCONT 0.01 1.53 0.13 
MBPL 0.46 0.83 0.41 
MFL 0.32 1.00 0.32 
CUTOFF1 38.17 0.94 0.35   
Main equation No control vs Partial control & Full Control 
No control & Partial control vs 
Full Control 
λ (Lambda) -0.53 -0.74 0.46 -0.02 -0.06 0.95 
AGE -0.01 -0.31 0.76 0.00 0.45 0.65 
REL -0.58 -1.46 0.15 0.03 0.12 0.91 
RCASTE 0.16 0.72 0.47 0.02 0.11 0.91 
ESTAT 0.25 0.74 0.46 0.11 0.71 0.48 
REDRES -0.11 -0.81 0.42 -0.06 -0.67 0.50 
EDHUSB 0.03 0.42 0.67 0.07 1.83 0.07 
HHSIZE -0.06 -1.29 0.20 -0.08 -1.85 0.06 
PCY 0.00 0.92 0.36 0.00 -0.90 0.37 
PCONT 0.00 -0.36 0.72 0.00 -0.21 0.84 
RPMEET (dropped) 0.24 1.82 0.07 
INTERCEPT 1.55 1.54 0.12 1.08 1.33 0.18 
ρ (Rho) -0.65   -0.02   




This paper examines one of the important dimensions of economic empowerment—
control over the income earned by the beneficiaries from SHG activities. In particular, we 
 have examined whether the identity of the political party implementing the scheme at the 
grassroots influences the control of income within the household of an SHG member. The 
results based on our field survey find strong evidence that the SHG movement in West 
Bengal has strong cross-effects with party allegiance. In particular, we see that the SHG 
members who are supporters of the more organized Left Front find it easier to establish a 
voice in the household. The causality of this empowerment has been analyzed in this 
paper and the extent of political participation—which is higher for SHG members in 
Left-run municipalities—identified as the likely channel of transmission.  
 
Thus, we should keep in mind that this empowerment may be an offshoot of their 
participation in the political arena and not necessarily the result of joining SHGs. This 
indicates the dangers of introducing pro-poor and inclusive measures in environments 
controlled significantly by political parties. Self-selection may lead to the overstatement 
of the extent of benefits and to a flawed evaluation of the success of such schemes. 
Moreover, the benefits of such schemes may be limited to members or supporters of 
political parties. 
 
The study calls for a closer and detailed investigation into the nature of the causality 
between empowerment, political participation and participation in collective action 
forums. Such a study, based on longitudinal data, constitutes a promising area of future 
research. Another interesting area of work could be to identify similarities, if any, 
between the SHG performance scenario in West Bengal with that in Kerala; another state 
of India with a longstanding tradition of Communist governance in a democracy.  
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(1) Literally, ‘Golden Jubilee Urban Employment Programme’. 
(2) The Central Government bears 75 per cent of the cost of the scheme; the state 
government bears the remaining 25 per cent. 
(3) For a brief review of the definition of empowerment and its determinants, see Husain 
et al. (2009, 2010), Kabeer (1999) and Narayan (2005). 
(4) Although the guidelines refer to Thrift and Credit Societies, the members and 
municipality officers refer to them as Thrift and Credit Groups. We have used the latter 
form here. 
(5) Allocations out of the Revolving Fund to a TCG is Rs 1,000 per member, subject to a 
ceiling of Rs 20,000. This amount may be used for purchasing raw materials, marketing, 
obtaining infrastructural support for income generating or group activities and some other 
specified activities not related to consumption needs. While the CDs members decide on 
the TCGs to whom the Revolving Fund will be allocated, the TCG decides on how many 
members will finally obtain the fund, and their respective shares. The amount has to be 
repaid within 10 months at a rate of 2 percent. (One USD is roughly equal to Rs 45). 
(6) DWCUAs were entitled, at the time of our study, to a maximum loan of Rs 250,000, 
of which 45 per cent is obtained from the bank, 50 per cent from the SUDA as subsidy, 
and 5 per cent represents its own contribution. This subsidy is payable only once to a 
 DWCUA. The Equated Monthly Instalment (EMI) on this loan is about Rs 3,800 per 
society. 
(7) Zari is the making of designs with golden threads in sarees (local dresses for women). 
(8) Based on a house-to-house survey of income and living standards in urban slums, the 
SUDA had created a list of below poverty line persons. Persons in this list are given a 
BPL card. 
(9) We have also tested for misspecification of the model by regressing RRINC on the 
square of the estimated residual. The insignificance of the coefficient rules out the 
possibility of misspecification. The variable parameter version of the ordered logit was 
chosen on the basis of the Brant test (rejecting the proportional odds assumption of the 
ordered logit model, χ2: 49.22; p-value: 0.00) and the likelihood ratio test between the 
variable parameter and partial proportional odds model (χ2: 22.78, p-value: 0.00). 
(10) A review of literature on ‘patronage democracy’ in India is provided in Harriss 
(2010). 
(11) An interesting anecdote is highly revealing regarding the difference in style of 
operation of the two parties. When we interviewed an intermediate-level Congress leader 
about the party's organizational structure, he was unable to give the name of several 
branches of his own party! 
(12) Given the socio-economic background of respondents, participation in political 
meetings, processions, demonstrations comprises a simple, easy to measure indicator of 
political participation (Human Resources and Skill Development, Canada webpage: 
Accessed at http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/.3ndic.1t.4r@-eng.jsp?iid=68 on 1 May 2012). 
Recent studies highlight the importance of such forms of participation in securing access 
to micro-credit (Karim 2011). 
(13) In Kaliagunj, for instance, the participation of women in demonstration activities 
against a bank that was reluctant in granting loans to women moulded their identity and 
increased their confidence. 
(14) In fact, it was the Congress that recently pushed through a bill seeking reservation of 
posts in legislatives bodies for women. 
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